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Outreach and Profitability Trade-off:
Does Synergy between Islamic Banking and Islamic
Microfinance Institutions Matter?
Ruri Eka Fauziah Nasution* and Habib Ahmed
Durham University

The purpose of this study is to examine the effectiveness of linkage program between Islamic
Banking (IB) and Baitul Maal Wat Tamwil (BMT) on BMT financing growth and profitability. This
study also aims to compare three linkage models and to explore the keys factors that affect the implementation of linkage program. To achieve these objectives, both quantitative and qualitative research
methods are employed. The dataset consists of the financial statement of 26 BMT in Indonesia and
interviews with 12 managers of BMT and IB in Jakarta. The findings suggest that a synergy between
IB and BMT through linkage program has significant impact on BMT financing growth and BMT
ROE. Among three linkage models, executing model appears to be the most preferable model, both by
BMT and IB. The finding also suggests that internal and external factors at BMT level have impacts
on the effectiveness of linkage program.
Keywords: Baitul Mal Wat Tamwil, Islamic Microfinance, Islamic Banking, Linkage program, Level
of Outreach, Profitability

Introduction
As a country with largest Muslim population
worldwide, Islamic Microfinance Institutions
(IMFI) in Indonesia have an important role to
support poverty alleviation program. Baitul Mal
Wat Tamwil (BMT) is the main player of IMFI
in Indonesia. BMT has grown significantly,
both in terms of number and total assets. There
are approximately 7500 BMTs in Indonesia in
2013 (Jamaludin, 2013) with total assets more
than IDR 6 trillionin 2011 (Oktarianisa, 2011).
However, since there is high demand of financing, it is difficult for BMT to meet this demand
from their deposits fund. In this regards, like
other Microfinance Institutions (MFI), BMTs
also face challenges in their sustainability to
provide financing for the poor and SME segments.

Islamic Banking (IB), on the other hand, has
large amount of fund. As part of Islamic financial system, IB has a social obligation to provide financing for Micro, Small, and Medium
Enterprise (MSME). However, IB finds barriers
to provide financing to MSME. These barriers
include the problems of asymmetric information, physical barriers of poor infrastructure, socioeconomic factors, lack of collateral and high
transaction cost (Ahmed, 2004). These barriers
also make it difficult for IB to provide financing
for the poorest segment of the population.
Conceptually, both IB and IMFI are intended
to contribute on social justice (Obaidullah &
Khan, 2008). IB and IMFI may compelement
one another in both ideological and practical
terms (Dhumale and Sapcanin, 1999). Both IB
and BMT are intended to contribute on social
justice. Each institution has its own strength
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and weakness in achieving this noble objective. A synergy between IB and BMT through
linkage programs expected to result in mutual
benefits. Linkage program is an attempt to promote synergy between IB and IMFI initiated by
Bank Indonesia and The Ministry of Cooperatives & SME which allows BMT to serve as an
intermediary between IB and customer, particularly to deliver the equity financing for MSME.
There is a need to focus on the benefits of linkage program, particularly on BMT side, which
can be measured by the level of outreach and
sustainability. In addition, this paper attempts
to identify most preferable linkage models and
investigate the key factors that affect the implementation of linkage program.

Literature Review
IMFIs in Indonesia dominated by Baitul
Mal Wat Tamwil (BMT). BMT is classified as
Islamic cooperatives and under the supervision of The Ministry of Cooperatives & SME.
According to Hadisumarto & Ismail (2010),
BMT has dual function; as a Baitut Tamwil and
Baitul Mal. The business function of BMT is
by serving as a financial intermediation. Most
BMTs in Indonesia are deposits-taken institutions, which serve as informal banks. The social
missions of BMT are serving as amil (collect
and distribute zakah), collecting and distributing infaq and shadaqah, and providing money
on qard al-hassan financing. Zakat, waqf, and
shadaqah are the main instruments in Islamic
scheme in poverty alleviation. These funds
have lower risk than debt in capital and are expected to reduce the need for diverting funds
into unproductive use. However, due to sustainability issues, IMFI cannot rely only on these
charity funds. Thus, it is important for IMFI to
explore other sources of fund.
Like IMFI, IB is a value-oriented system
which aims to achieve human centered economic development (Asutay, 2010). Dusuki
(2008) maintains with an impressive growth
of IB over the last 30 years, IB is expected to
emphasize on issues relating to social justice
through financial inclusive program. In other
words, IB is expected to provide financing to
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small and medium enterprise which are denied
by formal financial institutions and actively
participate in microfinance program to alleviate
poverty, rather than overemphasize on profitability. Further, Shahinpoor (2009) asserts that
since the the provision of debt is crucial for the
poor, Islamic bank have an important responsibility on meeting financing needs of the poor.
However, IB has been critisized for being unable to fulfil this objective. Rahman and Rahim
(2007) argues that the concept of financing the
poor by IB was not well developed, since many
IBs do not provide an easy access to financing
for the poor. In addition, most of IBs replace
PLS (Profit and Loss Sharing) scheme with
sales-based system.
Both IB and IMFIs aim to contribute in
achieving social justice. Both emphasize ethical, moral, social, and religious factors to promote equality and encourage enterpreneurship
and risk sharing (Obaidullah & Khan, 2008).
However, due to they are different in nature, IB
and IMFIs face different challenges in achieving this objectives. It is expected that synergy
between IB and IMFI results in mutual benefits. Some studies have proposed this synergy
through careful investigation about the link
between IB and IMFIs. For example, Ahmed
(2004) argues that IB can complement the IMFIs initiatives to provide financial services to
the poor. He further argues that due to IB’s large
scale, IB can provide microfinance services to
the poor without extra costs. Rahman (2007)
argues that there is a nexus between IB and microfinance since many features of microfinance
can be considered consistent with the broader
goals of IB. Further, Dusuki (2008) argues that
by practicing microfinance program, IB can
extend their financing to meet different type of
clients needs, and thus make positive contributions to the fulfilment of the socioeconomic
objectives of Islamic society,while maintaining
the institutional viablility, competitiveness, and
sustainability.
As an attempt to promote the synergy between IB and IMFIs, Bank Indonesia and The
Ministry of Cooperatives & SME initiate the
linkage program between IB and IMFI. This
program is a strategy to utilize the players in

2

Nasution and Ahmed: Outreach and Profitability Trade-off: Does Synergy between Islami
Nasution and Ahmed

MSME sectors by involving the entire components of financial industry (Abdullah, 2006).
Generally, there are three models of linkage
program; channelling, executing, and joint financing. In chanelling model, BMT serves as
middleman between IB and MSME. In executing model, IB provides financing to BMT to
be disbursed to BMT clients. In joint financing
model, IB and BMT together provide finance to
MSME.
Until 2009, there are 19 commercial banks
signed up for linkage program. Among these
banks, there are two IBs joint in linkage program. These IBs include Bank Muamalat Indonesia (partner with Islamic Rural Banks and
BMTs) with linkage fund amounted of IDR
66.586 billion and PT Bank Syariah Mandiri
(partner with Rural Bank and Islamic Rural
Bank) with with linkage fund amounted of IDR
27 billion (Bank Indonesia, 2009). In addition,
there are two Regional Development Banks
(BPD) who signed up linkage program with Sharia Rural Bank, Cooperative and BMT. These
two Regional Development Banks are PT BPD
Sumatera Utara with linkage fund amounted of
IDR 3.28 billion and PT BPD Riau with linkage fund amounted IDR 5.5 billion. Total credit
ceiling for the linkage program with sharia/
rural banks during July 2008 – March 2009 is
IDR 1.538 trilion while total credit ceiling for
the linkage program with Cooperatives and
BMT during July 2008 – March 2009 is IDR
1.928 trilion (Bank Indonesia, 2009). This data
shown that the credit ceiling of linkage fund to
cooperative and BMT is higher compared to the
sharia or rural banks.
Due to country-spesific case, empirical studies on the effectiveness of IB-BMT linkage
program is limited. Maesaroh (2011) provide
a case study about the effectiveness of linkage program between Bank Syariah Mandiri
with BMTs showing that linkage program insignificantly affects the performance of BMT
under observation. Kumara (2010) compares
the performance of rural bank which joins the
linkage program with those who does not join
linkage program. This study shows that linkage
program insignificantly affects the performance
of rural bank which join the linkage program.

Jubaedah (2009) investigates the linkage program between Bank Muamalat Indonesia and
Islamic Rural Banks showing that the executing
model is more effective and significantly affect
the performance of Islamic Rural Banks.
The BMT’s internal factor that might affect
the implementation of linkage program includes
low product diversification (Karim, Tarazi, &
Reille, 2008; Saad, 2012), lack of reporting
standard, lack of trainned personnel (Ahmed,
2004; Rusydiana & Devi, 2013), and lack of
managerial skills and inability to separate business aspect from social aspect (Cokro & Ismail,
2008). The external factor from BMT includes
lack of regulation and supervisory (Rusydiana
& Devi, 2013; Seibel, 2008), issues on profit
sharing fairness between BMT and IB, competition among BMTs, competition between BMT
and IB (Bambang, 2007), and unclear procedure and standard on linkage program.
IB internal factor that might affect the implementation of linkage program includes organization structure (Berger & Udell, 2002), lending
technology (Owulah, 1990), level and of profit
and monitoring cost (Huda, 2012; Shaban et al.,
2014). As in the BMT cases, IB external factors
include regulation issues (Shaban et al., 2014),
issues on profit sharing fairness between BMT
and IB, competition among BMT, competition
between BMT and IB, and unclear procedure
and standard on linkage program.

Research Method
To answer the research questions, both quantitative and qualitative research methods are
employed. Panel data regression model is employed to measure the effectiveness of linkage
program on BMT while semi-structured interviews is conducted to identify the most preferable linkage model and the key factors that
affect effectiveness of linkage program.
In panel data regression, there are 26 BMTs
which are located in Java Island and Province
of Lampung. Most BMT in Indonesia are located in the Java Island. In addition, Province of
Lampung is one of provinces outside the Java
Island which have significant growth of BMT. In
semi-structured interviews, purposive sampling
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Table 1. Variable Description
Variable
Measurement
Expected Relation to Dependent Variable
Dependent Variables
BFG
Log-difference of BMT’ total financing (after adjusted to Consumer Price Index 2010)
ROE
Net Income/Total Equity
Independent Variables
IBFG
Log-difference of IB total financing (after adjusted to Consumer Price Index 2010) Positive (+)
FG
Log-difference of BMT total funding (after adjusted to Consumer Price Index 2010) Positive (+)
Ln Assets Natural Logarithm of Total Assets
Positive (+)
GDPPG Growth of GDP per capita (after adjusted to Consumer Price Index 2010)
Positive (+)
CR
Credit to MSME/GDP
Indetermined
FER
IB Financing/BMT Total Equity
Indetermined
DAR
BMT Total Deposits/BMT Total Asset of BMT
Positive (+)
FAR
BMT Financing/BMT Total Assets
Positive (+)

is employed as the interview method for interviewing BMT and IB managers. In purposive
sampling, researcher purposely chooses object
who are relevant to the research topic (Sarantakos, 1994). There are seven BMTs involved
in the semi-structured interviews. Due to time
constraint, all BMTs sample in this study are
located in Jakarta. All BMTs sample in this research has as legal status as sharia cooperatives
which are under the supervision of The Ministry of Coopertives and SME. This legal status
has allowed BMTs to raise fund from public
(their members) and distribute the fund. BMT
has to receive linkage fund from one or more
IB to be eligible as research sample. All BMTs
sample in this research is engaged in executing model of linkage program which is based
on mudharabah contract. In this model, BMTs
receive regular funding from IB, in which one
BMTs also receive technical assistant. Some
BMTs from this study receive fund from more
than one IB. Further, the linkage fund is distributed by BMTs to their member, mainly in the
form of murabahah contract. In addition, one
IB manager is interviewed in order to complement the findings and point out IB key factors
that affecting the linkage program.

(individuals, firms, states, and the like) over
time”. There are three panel data models. The
first model is Pooled Least Square (PLS) which
requires that the slope coefficients are constant
among subjects and the error term is uncorrelated with the regressors. The second model is
Fixed Effects Model (FEM) which allows different intercept among individuals to reflect
unique characteristics of individual units. The
third model is Random Effect Model (REM)
which assumes that the intercept value of an individual units is random drawing from a larger
population with a global mean, in which an individual mean expressed as deviation from the
global mean value.
Panel data in this research is employed to
analyze the pattern of annual financing growth
and annual return on equity (ROE) of 26 BMTs
during 2011 and 2013. The panel is balanced
panel since the number of time observation is
the same for each individual (Gujarati, 2012).
The following basic panel regressions is estimated for the period of 2011-2013.
BFGit = α+β1IBFGit+β2FGit+β3LnAssetsit+
		 β4GDPPGit+β5CRit+(μi+εijt)
(1)

Panel Data Regression Model

ROEit = α+β6FERit+β7DARit+β8FARit+
		 β9LnAssetsit+αi+(μi+εijt)

This research focuses on two dimensions of
the effectiveness of linkage program on BMT:
BMT level of outreach and BMT sustainability.
Panel data regression model is utilised to answer the first research question. Gujarati (2012)
explains that “panel data regression models is
models that study the same group of entities

Table 1 provides the description of each
variable in panel regression model. Model (1)
focuses on the effectiveness of IB-BMT linkage program on BMT level of outreach. BMT
financing growth (BFG) is used as proxy for
level of outreach. BFG is measured based on
Wagner and Winkler (2013) who identify the
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determinants of real credit growth of MFI in the
global financial crisis period. At MFI level, the
factors include MFI source of fund, MFI total
risk, and MFIs size. MFI real credit growth is
expected to be positively associated with MFI
funding growth and negatively associated with
total risks. At macroeconomic level, the factors
include GDP growth (per capita), credit-toGDP ratio, and inflation. Both macroeconomic
variables are expected to have a non-linear relationship with real credit growth.
Based on Wagner and Winkler’s (2013)
work, panel regression is applied to test the
impact of IB financing growth on BMT financing growth, by controlling factors at BMT level
and macroeconomic variables. The dependent
variable, BFG, is BMT annual real financing
growth, a proxy for the level of outreach. The
main explanatory variable of interest, IBFG, is
the annual growth of total IB financing to BMT.
BMT funding growth (FG) and BMT size (ln
assets) are control variables from BMT level.
BMT funding growth is annual growth of total
saving and time deposits, a proxy for BMT ability to raise fund from sources other than IB. Ln
assets is natural logarithm of BMT total assets,
a proxy for BMT size. GDP growth (per capita)
and SME credit-to-GDP ratio are macroeconomic control variable. GDP growth (per capita) is proxy for the demand of microfinancing.
SME credit-to-GDP ratio is proxy for the supply of microfinance by formal banking sectors.
Model (2) focuses on the effectiveness of
linkage program on the BMT level of profitability. This model follows Muriu (2011) who
investigates the impact of financing choice on
MFI profitability. In his study, Muriu (2011)
identifies debt-to-equity ratio, deposits-toequity ratio, and loan-to-total assets ratio to
be linked with MFI profitability. Except the
debt-to-equity ratio which is indetermine, all
variables are expected to have positive relationship with MFI ROA. Based on Muriu’s work,
panel regression is employed to test wheter IB
financing has significant impact on BMT level
of profitability. The dependent variable, ROE,
is BMT return on equity, a proxy for BMT
level of profit. The main explanatory variable,
IB financing, is represented as percentage of

financing-to-BMT-total equity ratio (FER).
Other explanatory variables include depositsto-BMT-total assets ratio (DAR), financing-toBMT-total assets ratio (FAR), and ln assets as
proxy of BMT size.
Qualitative Research Interview
Semi-structured interviews are conducted
to complement panel regression analysis. This
method is also used to answer the question
about the most preferable linkage models and
the key factors that affect the implementation
of linkage program. The interviews involve 7
BMT managers and 5 IB officers. Blumberg,
Cooper, and Schindler (2011) explain that semistructured interviews are useful to understand a
wide-range of problem that allows researcher to
identify relevant issues to the problem. An important part of interview is thematizing an interview which include the formulation of research
question and a theoretical clarification of the
theme investigated. The thematizing process in
this research involves theoretical review on factors that might affect the implementation of IBBMT linkage program. According to Sekaran
and Bougie (2009), interview data analysis consists of three steps, which include data reduction, data display and data conclusion. In this
study, the transcription of audio-recorded interviews is made first. Due to small size of sample,
this study do not apply codification. Instead, the
data is categorized and organised into table to
present the analysis in simple way.

Result
Quantitative Analysis
Descriptive Statistic
The observation in this research includes
26 BMT located in Java Island and Province
of Lampung during period 2011-2013 with 78
total observations. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the observation.
The average of BFG is 28.5% with standard
deviation of 38.6%, while the average of ROE
is 24.1% with standard deviation of 36.6%.
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Mean
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev

BFG
0.285
1.320
-1.418
0.386

ROE
0.241
3.143
0.000
0.366

IBFG
0.385
3.084
-1.350
0.783

FG
0.342
4.502
-2.062
0.682

LnAssets
22.896
26.592
19.764
1.237

GDPPG
0.046
0.088
0.004
0.034

CR
0.021
0.031
0.009
0.009

FER
3.841
30.732
0.067
4.333

DAR
0.515
1.171
0.083
0.223

FAR
0.665
0.998
0.256
0.138

Table 3. Summary of Regression Results using PLS
Panel 1. Model 1 Estimation (PLS)
IBFG
BFG
0.085***
(3.053)
Panel 2. Model 2 Estimation (PLS)
FER
ROE
0.049***
(6.252)

FG
0.296***
(3.753)

LNASSETS
-0.003**
(-1.950)

DAR
0.351***
(11.324)

FAR
0.054
(0.094)

GDPPG
-2.342***
(-2.406)

CR
15.797***
(4.528)

LNASSETS
-0.008***
(-2.903)

R2
0.416

R2
0.451

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. t-stat is in parentheses.

Table 4. Summary of Regression Results using FEM
Panel 3. Model 1 Estimation (FEM)
Alpha
IBFG
BFG
-6.808**
0.039***
(-6.554)
(8.076)
Panel 4. Model 2 Estimation (FEM)
Alpha
FER
ROE
1.094***
0.051***
(4.998)
(14.510)

FG
0.183***
(9.564)
DAR
0.019
(0.338)

LNASSETS
0.294***
(6.555)
FAR
0.181***
(10.229)

GDPPG
1.650***
(4.198)
LNASSETS
-0.051***
(-6.808)

CR
8.734***
(20.864)
R2
0.893

R2
0.822

F-Stat
7.264***

F-Stat
13.904***

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. t-stat is in parentheses.

This financing growth and ROE are lower compared to the growth of fund raised by BMT. The
average of FG is 34.2% per year while the average of IBFG is 38.5%. However, this significant
growth is followed by high standard deviation
(68.2% for BFG and 78.3% for IBFG). This indicates that although on average there is significant growth on IBFG and BFG, these sources of
fund is rather widely dispersed, suggesting that
overall mean could be driven by a few BMT.
From BMT financial ratio, the average of FER
is 384.1%with standard deviation of 259.4%,
suggesting that few BMT are highly leveraged.
The average DAR is 0.51% with standard deviation of 0.22%. The average FAR is 0.66% with
standard deviation of 0.13%. From macroeconomic variables, the average of GDP per capita
growth is 4.6% per year while the average of
SME-credit-to-GDP ratio is 2.1% with 3.4%
and 0.09% standard deviation, respectively.
Classical Regression Assumption Test
As regression standard procedures, it is important to do classical regression assumption
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tests. However, since REM is employed using
a Generalized Least Square Method (GLS), this
step is not required. GLS technique is handled
automatically by E-Views to ensure that there is
no cross-correlations in the error terms (Brooks,
2008). Thus, test of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity are not required.
Estimation Methods
This section reports the regression results using three panel data estimation methods; PLS,
FEM, and REM; which have been discussed
above. For each method, both model (1) and (2)
are estimated.
Pooled Least Square Model
Table 3 reports regression results by using
PLS. Panel 1 shows that all the explanatory
variables are significant in explaining BMT
financing growth. For model 2, FER, DAR,
and Ln Assets are significant to explain BMT
ROE while FAR are not significant. The problem with this method is this method does not
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Table 5. Summary of Chow-test
Chow Test Model (1)
Chi-Square
Prob

3.176
0.000
Chow Test (Model 2)

Chi-Square
Prob

67.012
0.000

Table 6. Summary of Regression Results using REM
Panel 5. Model 1 Estimation (REM)
Alpha
IBFG
BFG
0.277
0.084***
(0.465)
(2.650)
Panel 6. Model 2 Estimation (REM)
Alpha
FER
ROE
0.720***
0.070***
(5.596)
(4.382)

FG
0.294***
(3.676)

LNASSETS
-0.015
(-0.600)

GDPPG
-2.110***
(-2.189)

DAR
0.386***
(3.311)

FAR
0.307***
(3.360)

LNASSETS
-0.050**
(-7.416)

CR
14.485***
(6.252)

R2
0.417

R2
0.641

F-Stat
10.316***

F-Stat
32.611***

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. t-stat is in parentheses.

Table 7. Summary of Hausmann-test
Hausman Test Model (1)
Chi-Square
Prob

0.000
1.000
Hausman Test Model (2)

Chi-Square
Prob

allow differences in average financing growth
at BMT level and thus cannot capture the BMT
specific effect (Brooks, 2008).
Fixed Effects Model
Unlike PLS, FEM allows different intercept
for each BMT to capture BMT-specific effects.
Table 4 reports regression results using FEM.
For model 1, all the explanatory variables are
significant. For model 2, all the explanatory
variables, except DAR, are significant to explain BMT ROE.
To determine whether PLS or FEM is more
appropriate or not, the Chow-test is conducted
(Brooks, 2008; Gujarati, 2012) as shown in Table 5.
Ho : Pooled Least Square Methods
H1 : Fixed Effects Methods
Based on Table 5, since the probability of
Chi-square for both model is less than 0.05 indicating that null hypothesis is rejected for both
equation. Thus, FEM is more appropriate then
the PLS.

0.000
1.000

Random Effects Methods
As in FEM, the REM allows different intercept for each entity and this intercept is constants across the time. The difference, however,
REM assumes that the intercept for each entity
arise from a common intercept α plus a random
variable εi. Table 6 reports the regression result
using REM. As Panel 5 indicated, except BMT
size, all the explanaory variables are significant (with α = 1%) to explain BMT financing
growth. For model 2, all the explanatory variables are significant (with α = 1%) to explain
BMT ROE.
To determine whether FEM or REM is more
appropriate or not, the Hausman-test is conducted (Brooks, 2008; Gujarati, 2012) as shown
in Table 7.
Ho : Random Effects Methods
H1 : Fixed Effects Methods
Based on Table 7, the probability of Chisquare for both models is less than 0.05. The
null hypothesis for both models are rejected,
which indicate that REM is more appropriate

63
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2015

7

The Indonesian Capital Market Review, Vol. 7, No. 2 [2015], Art. 1
INDONESIAN CAPITAL MARKET REVIEW • VOL.VII • NO.2

than FEM. There are two additional explanations why REM is more appropriate. First, although FEM allows for entity-specific effects,
this model requires that the number of periods
should be equal or more than the number of
observations (T≥N). The data in this research,
however, is short panel where the number
of cross-section or individual units N (26) is
greater than the number of time periods, T (3).
Second, it is not the interest of this research to
investigate BMT specific-effects.
Analysis of Regression Results
Linkage Program and BMT Level of Outreach
Results on Panel 5 on Table 6 show that IB
financing growth to BMT through linkage program is associated with BMT financing growth,
and thus, increases the level of outreach. IB
financing growth is statistically significant
(α=1%) with positive sign. As indicated by the
coefficient, BMT financing growth increases
by 0.084% with 1% increase in IB financing
growth. Wagner and Winkler (2013) argue that
MFI credit growth rises with the ability of MFI
to rise funding from external sources. Coleman
(2007) studies the impact of leverage on MFI
and argues that, although it is not significant,
MFIs with long-term debt (financing) shows
positive relationship with level of outreach.
This finding, however, is inconsistent with
Hoque, Chishty, and Halloway (2011) who argue that leverage decrease the level of outreach
to the very poor because of increase in cost of
capital leads to higher cost of borrowing, higher
default rate and increase risk. In the case of Islamic Microfinance (IMFI), this problem might
not arise since most IMFI use ZIS fund to serve
the very poor segment. The same case with
BMT, they provide qardul-hassan loan from
ZIS fund to serve the very poor segment and to
make them feasible to receive regular financing. IB financing is disbursed as productive financing only for the micro segments.
Notwithstanding IB financing has a significant impact on BMT financing growth, the
economic significance is rather small. There
are three possible explanations. First, although
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linkage program is designed to promote synergy between IB and BMT, the real fact indicates that there is competition between IB and
BMT in enhancing their market share (Bambang, 2007). In addition, based on Bank Indonesia statistic, there is an increase on IB office
branch from 1.763 in 2010 to 2.669 in 2013.
This data implies that IB focuses on improving
their infrastructure and networking by increasing their branch office 53% which enable them
to serve the poor directly (Sholahuddin, 2013).
Second, full support from the government on
linkage program has not been received, particularly for BMT. Although the government
provides guarantee for BMT, most of them still
find difficulties to access financing from bank
due to the collateral requirement. In addition,
Islamic Cooperative performance appraisal set
by the Ministry of Cooperatives is less valid
from the IB point of view (Oktarianisa, 2011).
Third, as shown by descriptive statistics that
the high standard deviation on IB financing is
rather widely dispersed, suggesting that overall mean could be driven by a few BMT, probably large BMT. This implies that IB financing
might be concentrated only on few large BMT
with minimum risks.
BMT funding growth is highly positively associated with BMT financing growth. The coefficient indicated that an increase of 1% in BMT
funding growth will increase BMT financing
growth by 0.29%. Tchuigoua (2014) maintains
that deposit is one of resources used by MFI to
provide loan. For some MFI, deposits also reinforce the credit contract and serve as collateral.
All BMT in this sample are deposits-taken institutions. They require deposits (minimum for
3 month) as a prerequisite to provide financing.
This result implies that deposit is still the main
sources of funds for BMT to extend financing
for their clients.
Both GDP growth and SME credit-to-GDP
growth are highly significant in explaining BMT
financing growth. The negative sign on GDP
growth suggests that BMT financing growth
will decrease about 2.11% with GDP growth
rising by 1%. This finding is inconsistent with
Tchuigoua (2014) and Ahlin et al. (2011) and
other robust arguments on positive relationship
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between credit supply-demand and economic
growth. However, possible explanation is given by Wagner and Winkler (2013) who argue
that growing economy is associated with a decline in the number of informal business sector,
the main client group of MFI. Kiss, Nagy, and
Vonnack (2006) argue that, at firm level, an increase in GDP is associated with increasing in
productivity through higher profits and make it
possible for firms to rely more on internal fund.
At household level, households might want to
decrease loan to smooth consumption at time
when their income is temporarily exceed the
expected levels.
The positive coefficient on SME credit-toGDP ratio suggests that BMT funding growth
increase by about 14.48% with credit-to-GDP
ratio increase by 1%. Wagner and Winkler
(2013) maintain that the impact of credit-toGDP ratio might be non-linear. At one side, if
MFIs and formal banks substitute one another,
the increase in credit-to-GDP ratio is expected
to decrease the MFIs credit growth since more
people will have easier financial access to formal banking. On the contrary, if MFIs and banking sector complement each other, an increase
in credit-to-GDP ratio is expected to increase
MFIs credit growth as this will enable MFI to
access commercial loans and extend this loan
to their clients (Tchuigoua, 2014). Similarly,
Ahlin et al. (2011) suggest that formal financial sector might complements MFIs by providing incentives to maintain good credit histories
and by allowing enterprise to advance beyond
microcredit. At this point, enterprise with good
credit history which initially is MFI client has
an opportunity to access financing from formal
financial sector. The regression results support
the second argument, in which BMT and the
whole banking sectors complement each other.
However, an interesting point should be made
when this result is linked toprevious result suggesting that IB financing growth has a relatively low impact on BMT financing growth.
As banking sector in Indonesia consists of both
conventional and Islamic bank, a highly significant coefficient of credit-to-GDP ratio might
indicate that there is a possibility commercial
loan from conventional bank is one of determi-

nants of BMT financing growth.
Linkage Program and BMT Level of Profit
Results on Panel 6 on Table 6 show that IB
financing growth as percentage of BMT equity
(FER) has significant impact on BMT ROE.
The coefficient sign is positive (α = 1%) indicates that a 1% increase in IB financing-toBMT-total equity ratio will increase BMT ROE
by 0.07%. This result is consistent with study
by Muriu (2011) who finds that debt-to-equity
ratio has positive impact on profitability. He
further explains that if MFI could finance their
operation using long-term debt with higher
margin than the cost of the debt, the shareholders would benefit as more earnings are being
spread among the same number of shareholders.
Similarly, Coleman (2007) argues that higher
leverage will result higher level of outreach and
higher premium. This premium then becomes
MFI source of income and profitability.
Result shows that BMT can earn higher margin than cost of fund from IB, which in turn
increase BMT’s ROE. The use of leverage can
reduce the agency problem between outside
equity holders and manager. Higher leverage
raises efficiency since this will increase manager motivation to maximize the shareholders
value (Berger and Di Patti, 2006). In BMT case,
this theory might be translated that higher IB
financing will increase BMT manager motivation to raise efficiency, thus raise the profitability, to ensure BMT is able to make installments
to IB.
The economic significance of IB financing
to ROE is relatively small. This might be explained by the asymmetric information between
IB and BMT. In this case, BMTs are the holder
of information. Binks et al. (cited in Berggren,
Olofsson, & Silver, 2000) argue that the uneven distribution between IB and BMT results
in increase on informational cost that may reduce the profitability. In addition, based on interview result, one of interviewee indicates that
although linkage program has allowed BMT
to earn margin, the margin is relatively small
and as the result it is difficult for BMT to accumulate capital from this spread. Another BMT
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manager states that linkage program does not
help BMT to be self-sufficient due to the short
term financing period. In the case of BMT with
small assets, it is difficult to maximize the fund
turnover in order to maximize the return. Another possible explanation is related to financing risk. In executing model, BMT bears all the
financing risk. When the default rate is high,
this factor may limit BMT ability to earn high
profit since the profit from linkage fund might
be offset by BMT expense to cover the financing default.
Among control variable, deposits-to-BMTtotal assets ratio is highly associated with increase in ROE in positive sign. An increase 1%
in DAR ratio will increase BMT ROE by 0.38%.
This result also consistent with Muriu (2011)
who argues that large share of deposits-to-assets appears to boost MFI profitability since
large deposit will lower overall MFI cost of
fund. BMT financing-to-BMT-total assets ratio
positively associated with ROE. The coefficient
of FAR suggests that an increase 1% in FAR
ratio will increase BMT ROE by 0.30%. This
result is inconsistent with Muriu (2011) who
finds negative relationship between FAR and
profitability. However, he explains that MFIs
specializes in lending which enables MFIs to
earn more interest revenue due to higher risk
and thus has a positive impact on ROE. The
coefficient of negative ln assets might indicate
that larger BMT tend to be less efficient (Berger
& Di Patti, 2006).
Qualitative Analysis
This section reports semi-structured interviews report. Interviews are conducted to answer the second and the third research question
regarding the factors that affect linkage program and the best linkage model.
Motivation, Awareness, and Effectiveness of
Linkage Program
Most BMT join the linkage program due to
the needs for additional fund. However, this
factor is not the only motivation to join linkage
program. Another factor includes the need to
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build synergy with other Islamic Financial Institutions and the need to maintain liquidity. On
IB side, enlarging the market penetration is the
only motivation to provide financing for BMT.
Most BMT managers are aware with executing
and channeling linkage model, however, they
are not aware with joint financing linkage model since this model has not been applied widely.
In terms of the effectiveness of linkage
program, most interviewees state that linkage
program helps BMT to increase the number of
BMT clients and help BMT to be self-sustained.
BMTs in the sample use linkage fund to expand
their financing. One interviewee states that the
demand for BMT financing from local community is increasing so that BMT need external financing to meet this demand. In addition, linkage fund is also helping one BMT to increase
its reputation due to its increase in liquidity to
service fund withdrawal from its member as
well as to provide financing. Although margin
earned form this linkage fund is relatively small,
but if the number of BMT clients increase, the
margin will be significant. However, one interviewee states that linkage program does not
help BMT to be self-sustained in the short-term
financing. In the short-term period, BMTs are
still unable to earn sufficient incomes which enforce BMTs to make the installment by using
the financing principal. The overall results confirm the panel regression results which suggest
that linkage program increase BMT level of
outreach and profitability. From IB side, three
of five respondents state that linkage program
help Islamic Bank to fulfill the social objective
to finance the poor.
Preferred Linkage Model
Among three linkage models, executing
model appears to be most effective model, both
for IB and BMT. Since joint financing model
has not been applied there are only two linkage
models; executing and channeling model. Currently, most BMT and IB use and prefer executing linkage model. Channeling model is used to
finance clients with large amount of financing
that is beyond BMT ability.
BMT prefer to use executing model since
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Table 8. Comparison between Linkage Models
Comparison Between Linkage Model (BMT)
Executing

Channeling

Advantages:
1. High level of flexibility
2. Minimize the risk of losing customer
3. Higher spread between cost of fund and cost of financing
4. Convenience

Advantages:
1. Larger Financing Size
2. No financing risk

Disadvantages:
1. Financing risk
2. Collateral requirement
3. Additional monitoring costs
4. Less-Sharia compliant

Disadvantages:
1. Risk on losing customer
2. Rigid procedure and requirement

Comparison Between Linkage Model (IB)
Executing

Channeling

Advantages:
1. IB delegate financing to BMT
2. BMT can develop financing concept
3. Easier feasibility analysis process

Advantages:
1. High level of security
2. Rigid feasibility analysis

Disadvantages:
1. Difficult to monitor

Disadvantages:
1. Takes longer time in feasibility analysis
2. Takes more effort to monitor BMT one by one

this model has high flexibility in terms of the
disbursement of linkage fund. BMT manage,
distribute, monitor, and collect the repayment
of linkage fund directly to their clients. Higher
risk in executing model is followed by higher
margin, about 2% - 3%. On the comparison,
in channeling model, since IBs fully bear the
risk, BMTs only earn small fee (about 0.25%)
for serving as middlemen between IB and clients. In addition, executing model enable BMT
to minimize the risk of losing their clients. In
channeling model, BMTs serve as middleman
between IB and clients, in which IB can access
information about the clients. Unlike executing
model, in channeling model IB interact with the
clients and conduct direct survey before providing financing. Since channeling clients are perceived as potential clients, there is a risk that IB
will take over these clients by providing direct
financing to them and reduce BMTs’ market
share.
IB prefers executing model for three reasons.
First, compare to channelling model, the analysis process in executing model is more straight
forward since the object of the analysis is BMT
instead of end users. Second, IB reduce the risk
of financing since BMT bears all the risk. This
guarantees IB to receive a full payment of the
principal plus the profit-sharing from the fi-

nancing. On the contrary, in channelling model,
IB bear all the financing risk. The monitoring
process in executing model is also easier as IB
only needs to monitor BMT. Finally, since IBs
have various financing segments, delegating the
monitoring process to BMT in executing model
allows IB to focus on these various financing
segments. The comparison between executing
and channelling model is presented on Table 8.
Key Factors on the Effectiveness of Linkage
Program
BMT Key Factors on the Effectiveness of
Linkage Program
Results from interviews findings suggest that among BMT internal factors, lack of
trained personnel, and lack of managerial skill
are the key factors that affect the effectiveness
of linkage program. The external factors seem
to have more impact on effectiveness of linkage
program. These include lack of regulation and
supervision, fairness issue on PLS, and competition between BMT and IB.
Two of seven BMT interviewees state that
lack of trained personel affects the effectiveness of linkage program. For example, although
training is less needed for financing officers to
67
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collect the payments, training is highly important for marketing staffs who sell the products
since these marketing staffs bring new products (Sharia compliant products). The other
interviewees also indicate that there is lack of
training for BMT staffs. However, this lack of
training might not affect the effectiveness of the
linkage program since most of their staffs are
familiar with the process and the system.
In the case of lack of managerial skills, three
of seven interviewees state that lack of mangerial skills affects the effectiveness program. This
managerial skill usually related to lack of business focus and individual characters. For example, there is a case where due to lack of business focus, BMT managers provide financing
to a capital-intensive project, such as property
project, which is not suitable for BMT. There is
also a case when due to manager’s carelessness,
the BMT have difficulties to access new financing from banks.
Lack of product diversification does not affect the effectiveness of linkage program. Although there are various types of sharia contract, most BMT use murabahah, ijarah, and
mudharabah as their underlying contract for
their products where largest financing proportion is dominated by murabahah contract. The
linkage fund will be distributed in the form of
these three contracts. It is not the type of underlying contract that affect the effectiveness of
linkage program. The effectiveness of linkage
program depend on the ability of BMTs’ marketing staff to sell existing product and distribute the linkage fund through these product. In
addition, two interviewees state that BMT have
higher product diversification compared to IB
and this variety of products become one of the
reason why IBs are interested doing linkage
program with BMT.
Lack of reporting standard became challenge for BMT only at the beginning of linkage
program. Some IB partners are also involved in
giving assistance and training on reporting. All
interviewees state that combining both business and social aspects does not affect the effectiveness of linkage program. Two interviewees state that both business and social aspects
are synergy. There is a case of one BMT in the

68
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/icmr/vol7/iss2/1
DOI: 10.21002/icmr.v7i2.4853

sample which utilize synergy between social
and business aspect of BMT. At the begining
this BMT provide financing to extremely poor
clients in the form of charity (using zakat, infaq, and shadaqah fund) which is part of BMTs
social function. At the first step, BMT provide the fund for free. After the recepient run
the business and find the best pattern on their
business, BMT then strengthen this by giving
qardul-hassan loan. At the first step, there is no
administration process. However, in the second
step there is adminstration process. The clients
need to sign a contract and they must pay the
loan principal. The qardul-hassan loan is provided maximal twice. If these clients shows
significant increase in cash inflow, then they
can access regular financing from BMT that enable BMT to earn margin. Another interviewee
states that when the business aspect of BMT
is stagnant, social aspect can complement this
stagnation by providing development or empowerment programs using social fund.
Among BMT external factors, lack of regulation and supervision, fairness issue on PLS
and competition between BMT and IB affect
the effectiveness of linkage program. The Ministry of Cooperatives & SME provides training
to BMT about the new regulation and provides
BMT performance appraisal and rating BMT.
The Ministry of Cooperative & SME also requires BMT to submit their financial report regularly. However, this monitoring is less strict
compared to IB standard and without sufficient
feedback.
Two interviewees state that the profit sharing
between BMT and IB is not fair enough. One
interviewee states that the profit-sharing for IB
is higher compared to conventional bank. The
spread BMT earned is small because IB financing is more expensive compared to deposits
fund received from BMT member. As the result, it is difficult to accumulate capital from the
margin with current profit sharing. For example, one BMT charge 2-2.5% higher than cost
of fund on its clients. Another BMT earn 2%
margin in which 0.5% of this margin is paid for
account officer fee. The rest interviewees state
that the profit sharing between BMT and IB in
linkage program is fair enough. Current profit
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sharing scheme still allow BMT to maximize
their financing. In addition, the flexibility in using the linkage fund also benefits the BMT.
Regarding competition between BMT and
IB, most interviewees state that this does not
affect the effectiveness of the linkage program.
However, they state that most BMTs concern
about this issue. For example, most BMT avoid
using channelling model since this scheme requires BMT to provide comprehensive data
about the clients. An interesting insight is there
are some cases when IBs try to offer financing
to BMT clients directly but the clients are uncomfortable with IB procedure and decide to
borrow from BMT although with higher margin. All interviewees state that competition
between BMT does not affet the effectiveness
of linkage program. In addition, they also state
that linkage program procedure is clear.
Among other factor from BMT point of view
includes the risk-sharing. The underlying contract in executing model commonly is mudharabah. However, current practice is that BMT
fully bear the default risk should clients fail
to make the repayment. BMT are responsible
to make regular payment and the principal of
linkage fund. This practice raise two important
issues. First, from Sharia perspective, it is not
permissible. Under mudharabah contract, in the
absence of BMT neglience, IB as rab ul maal
should bear the risk if clients fail to make repayment. Second, from economic perspectives,
this practice limits BMT income-accumulation
process since the income is used to cover the
default financing.
IB Key Factor on the Effectiveness of Linkage
Program
Banking regulation is the only relevant key
factor that may impact the effectiveness of linkage program. For example, the capital requirement from central bank will affect the loanable
fund available. This will affect the allocation or
proportion of IB financing to BMT. However,
interview’s results indicate that IB still has low
level of confidence on BMT. IB concerns on
BMT legal status, BMT ability to analyze and
monitor the financing, and the gap between IB

and BMT. Regarding the legal status, IB prefer
to finance BMT who have legal status as Islamic
Cooperatives. In addition, since Islamic Cooperatives are under the Ministry of Cooperatives,
it is expected that the regulation and the monitoring on BMT to be more stringent since this
will make IB work in analyzing BMT easier
before giving the financing. IB also concern on
the quality of BMT in analysing and monitoring
their clients who will be financed. The gap between IB and BMT also affect the effectiveness
of linkage program.

Discussion and Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to investigate the
impact of the synergy between IB and BMT
through linkage program on BMT levels of outreach and profitability. This paper also aims to
investigate the most preferable linkage model
and key factors on the effectiveness of linkage program. Using panel data regression and
semi structured interview, results reveal that IB
financing has positively associated with BMT
financing growth and BMT ROE. This implies
that IB financing enable BMT to increase the
level of outreach and the level of profitability.
Currently, among three linkage models, executing model appears to be the most effective
model. Both IB and BMT have their internal and
external factors which affect implementation of
linkage program. BMT’s internal key factors
that affect the effectiveness of linkage program
include BMT managerial skill and the quality
of human resources, while the BMT’s external
factor include the regulation and supervision,
the PLS scheme between IB and BMT, and the
competition between BMT and IB. Meanwhile,
IB’s internal key factors on the effectiveness
of linkage program are banking regulation and
low level of IB confidence on BMT ability.
This paper argues that although the economic significance of IB financing to BMT is still
small, the synergy between IB and BMT benefits both parties and also can help in realizing
Sharia objective to provide access to finance
for the poor. The argument above is based on
mutual benefits from IB-BMT linkage program.
From BMT side, the benefits from joint link-
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age program include an increase on the level
of outreach and profitability. In addition, linkage program also allows transfer of knowledge
from IB to BMT. From IB sides, linkage program allows IB to meet their social obligation
and at the same time to minimize the risk from
financing the poor. Most importantly, from economic point of view, linkage program is an income-generating activity that allows IB to earn
profit and enlarge the financing diversification.
In addition, BMT deposits their clients’ saving
fund on IB. These funds have low cost of fund
which can be used by IB to extend short-term
financing and generate income.
The results of this study have several implications. Firstly, at BMT level, it is important
for BMT to balance both social and business
aspects. Results indicate that some BMTs have
left their social mission behind. They only disburse institutional zakah or infaq instead of acting as amil. This shifting on mission is inconsistent with the responsibility of BMT as IMFI.
Based on hadith about how Prophet SAW
(peace be upon him) respond to a man of Ansar who begged for him, Obaidullah and Khan
(2008) describe the fundamental conditions of
a successful microfinance program. This fundamental condition includes access and assess
the poorest, transformation of unproductive
assets with involvement of larger community
in the process, meeting the basic needs, direct
involvement in capacity building, technical assistance, transparent accounting, and liberty to
use part of income to meet higher needs. In this
case, BMT can use ZIS (Zakah Infaq Shadaqah)
fund to identify the poorest segment of the society and meet their basic needs. Thus, ZIS fund
should be disbursed in the form of zakat, infaq,
or shadaqah for consumption needs. In the second step, in order to transform unproductive assets, BMT can use ZIS fund to provide qardul
hassan to enable the poorest to start new business. To support the new business, it is important that BMT monitor and assist the business
through direct involvement. In the third step,
when the business can generate income consistently, BMT can provide regular financing using linkage fund by utilising executing model.
Finally, as the business grow larger and need
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larger amount of financing, BMT can use channelling model to link the same client to IB.
Secondly, BMT should be careful in determining the margin rate charged to their clients.
High cost of fund charged by IB can lead BMT
to increase margin rate on final clients in order to earn profit. Although profitability is an
important factor on sustainability, charging unreasonable margin will decrease the demand on
BMT financing since demand for microfinance
service is not inelastic. Unjustified high margin is inconsistent with the noble objectives of
BMT to empower Muslim community. Moreover, high margin lowers the rate of repayment
and thus lowers the profitability (Cull, Kunt,
and Morduch, 2007). Instead of charging higher
margin to their clients, it is preferable that BMT
focuses on how to increase their efficiency so
that they can maximize the spread between cost
of fund and operating cost.
At the IB level, there are three implications.
First and the most important implication is related to Sharia issue. As discussed previously,
most BMTs use executing model with mudharabah as the underlying contract. It is expected
that IB bear the financing risk instead of requiring regular fixed payment and principal to
be guaranteed by BMT. In order to minimize
the risk, IB can initiate to apply joint financing model that allow IB share the financing risk
with BMT. Second, since the PLS rate between
IB and BMT depends on IB cost of fund, IB
should carefully identify and allocate funding
from third party with the lowest cost of fund.
This allows IB to charge lower cost of financing to BMT. It is expected that BMT is still
profitable without charging high margin to their
clients. Third, since most IB is less confidence
with BMT ability to analyse and monitor the
financing, transfer of knowledge may benefit
both institutions. It is expected that transfer of
knowledge will narrow down the gap between
IB and BMT.
Fourth, at regulator level, linkage program
requires better coordination between Bank Indonesia and The Ministry of Cooperatives &
SME. However, there is a gap in regulation
and supervision. The general framework is that
Bank Indonesia support the program by setting
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regulation that allows IMFI to get access to financial services while The Ministry of Cooperative & SME supporst this program by providing technical assitance to IMFIs to help them
become feasible to access financing from bank.
On the IB side, there is well-established banking regulation to facilitate the implementation
of linkage program. To promote financial inclusion program in Indonesia, Bank Indonesia has
stipulated Bank Indonesia Regulation (Number 14/22/PBI/2012) concerning on Loan and
Financing Channelling by Commercial Bank
and Technical Assistance in Developing Micro,
Small, and Medium Enterprise. This regulation
has mandated banking sector to have minimum
of 20% MSME as their target market. Bank Indonesia also gives technical assistance to banks
to prepare their human resources in providing
financing to MSME. As an incentives, Bank Indonesia publishes banks ratings based on their
credit portion on MSME. On the other hand,
The Ministry of Cooperatives & SME has not
played significant role in assisting BMT to become feasible for financing access. In order to
have access on IB financing, BMT must have
legal status as cooperative. However, this legal
status is not sufficient. The regulation and supervision on BMT is not as strict as on banking
regulation which increase the uncertainty for IB
to provide financing to BMT.
Although Bank Indonesia has shown significant role in promoting and facilitating the
linkage program, however, some banking regulations such as collateral, cash collateral, and
business permit certificate requirements have
hindered BMT to join the linkage program.
Further consideration about this requirement
for IMFI should be taken in order to increase
the number of BMT in the linkage program.
The Ministry of Cooperatives & SME has many
tasks to be accomplished. The most important
task is to make the regulation on BMT more
stringent since this will help IB to do the analysis on BMT performance. There should be regular monitoring on BMT and proper feedback
from this monitoring should be provided. Garmaise and Natividad (cited in Ghosh and Tassel,
2011) argue that when MFI receive favourable
external ratings, there is a significant reduction

in their cost of financing. Although The Ministry of Cooperatives & SME provide the regular
training for BMT, the quality and quantity of
the trainings should be improved and cover the
BMT demands.
To conclude, both the IB and BMT have
their own role in Islamic financial system. Ideally, as IB represents the largest proportion in
Islamic financial system, IB should contribute
more to achieve social objectives. However, it
is unlikely that one institution does all the jobs.
Due to their responsibility as mudharib, IB is
responsible to manage their clients’ fund to the
best of their interest. In addition, the level of
public understanding and acceptance on PLS
scheme is still low. Mismanagement by IB in
allocating their third party fund will decrease
the level of public confidence on IB. However,
IB still can fulfil its social objectives through
two-steps financing. BMTs have competitive
advantage on dealing with MSME clients that
is difficult to be replicated by IB. Their close relationship with their clients and their flexibility
in funding and financing become their most important competitive advantage. However, BMT
scale is relatively small. They need additional
fund to increase the scale of financing. The synergy between IB and BMT, if conducted properly and fairly, will help these institutions meet
their social objectives.
Due to time and data constrain, this study
has some limitation. First, the financial data is
only consists of 26 BMTs within short periode.
In addition, this financial data also limited to
major items in BMTs’ balance sheet and income statement without further detail description. Second, the sample in the interview is limited only in Jakarta which are considered less
representative to describe the BMT population
which mostly located in West Java, Central
Java, and East java. An improvement can be
made in further study by providing wide range
of BMT’s financial data. In addtion, to measure
the level of outreach, it is important to have the
exact number of BMT’s clients before and after
joining linkage program. The large number of
both BMT and IB interview sample will also
enhance the findings of further research.
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